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Abstract
Background
A rapid review, guided by a protocol, was conducted to inform development of the World
Health Organization’s guideline on personal protective equipment in the context of the
ongoing (2013–present) Western African filovirus disease outbreak, with a focus on health
care workers directly caring for patients with Ebola or Marburg virus diseases.
Methods
Electronic databases and grey literature sources were searched. Eligibility criteria initially
included comparative studies on Ebola and Marburg virus diseases reported in English or
French, but criteria were expanded to studies on other viral hemorrhagic fevers and non-
comparative designs due to the paucity of studies. After title and abstract screening (two
people to exclude), full-text reports of potentially relevant articles were assessed in dupli-
cate. Fifty-seven percent of extraction information was verified. The Grading of Recommen-
dations Assessment, Development and Evaluation framework was used to inform the
quality of evidence assessments.
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Results
Thirty non-comparative studies (8 related to Ebola virus disease) were located, and 27 pro-
vided data on viral transmission. Reporting of personal protective equipment components
and infection prevention and control protocols was generally poor.
Conclusions
Insufficient evidence exists to draw conclusions regarding the comparative effectiveness of
various types of personal protective equipment. Additional research is urgently needed to
determine optimal PPE for health care workers caring for patients with filovirus.
Introduction
The family Filoviridae includes three genera, Cuevavirus, Ebolavirus, andMarburgvirus. Four
ebolaviruses (Bundibugyo virus, Ebola virus, Sudan virus, and Taï Forest virus) cause Ebola
virus disease (EVD) and two maburgviruses (Marburg virus and Ravn virus) cause Marburg
virus disease (MVD) [1]. EVD and MVD are severe illnesses in humans, with a combined
mean case fatality rate of 55.4% [2]. The natural hosts of the filoviruses are unknown but fruit
bats have been implicated in the transmission of Marburg virus and Ravn virus [3,4]. The
majority of cases in an outbreak become infected from direct contact through non-intact skin
or mucous membranes with the bodily fluids of infected symptomatic persons or the body of
deceased persons. Airborne transmission of filoviruses has not been documented in humans
[5,6]. The incubation period for both filovirus diseases is in the range of 2 to 21 days [7,8].
Patients are infectious once they start to exhibit symptoms which include sudden onset fever,
fatigue, headaches and muscle pain followed by diarrhea, vomiting, and lethargy [7–9]. EVD
patients frequently experience severe dehydration, kidney and liver dysfunction.[7] Patients of
both diseases may experience internal and external bleeding in the later course of the disease,
around 5–7 days [7,8,10]. Although different diseases, EVD and Marburg virus disease (MVD)
have similar presentations, case fatality rate, and transmission mechanism. Both have no spe-
cific treatment to date.
Outbreaks of EVD have occurred since 1976. A rapidly evolving outbreak that has presumed
to have emerged in December 2013[11], and is ongoing as of the date of publication of this
manuscript, has yielded the highest number of cases and deaths. As of 30 August 2015, 11290
deaths have occurred from among 28073 confirmed, probable, and suspected cases reported
from countries most affected by the outbreak, namely, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone [12].
When infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, there is a high risk of
transmission to healthcare workers (HCWs) treating those with suspected or known filovirus
infection. In the three most affected countries, a total of 513 reported deaths have occurred as
of 30 August 2015 among 881 HCWs known to have been infected with EVD [12]. Inadequate
source control, insufficient training on appropriate IPC practices, shortages of personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE) and improper PPE use, long working hours in the face of a shortage of
medical personnel, and transmission outside the patient care setting are possible explanations
[12,13].
Specifications for the components of PPE to be worn during delivery of care are important,
not only to reduce the likelihood of transmission to HCWs from a barrier standpoint but to
also ensure comfort and safety as wearing PPE increases the risk of heat stress and the loss of
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dexterity [14,15]. The PPE worn should also allow for the best possible care to patients. Cur-
rently, PPE recommendations and protocols differ across organizations responding to the out-
break, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
[16,17].
WHO issued recommendations on PPE for use by HCWs managing patients with known or
suspected filovirus disease in October 2014 [17]. To inform these recommendations, we per-
formed a rapid review of the evidence on the effectiveness of different types of PPE in prevent-
ing ebolavirus transmission and on levels of dexterity and discomfort, for example, comparing
gowns versus coveralls or comparing single versus doubles gloves.
Methods
We performed a “rapid review”, a type of review produced using accelerated and/or modified
systematic review methods in order to accommodate an expedited turnaround time [18]. The
rapid review was conducted over a 7-week period from 28 July to 12 September 2014. This
rapid review was guided by a protocol (S1 Appendix) that was developed a priori by the
authors and then reviewed by the guideline development group–a group of external experts
who were invited by WHO to formulate recommendations regarding PPE use. The protocol
allowed for modifications of scope and analysis during review conduct once the nature and vol-
ume of the evidence was known. We used the PRISMA reporting guideline for systematic
reviews for the reporting of our work in this paper (S2 Appendix) [19].
The research question for this review was: what are the benefits and harms of double gloves,
full face protection, head cover, impermeable gowns, particulate respirators, and rubber boots
as PPE when compared with alternative and potentially less robust PPE for HCWs directly car-
ing for patients with filovirus disease? Our lens for the review starts with the prevention of
transmission to the HCW and subsequent transmission prevention from HCW to other
patients.
Eligibility criteria for studies
We included studies of HCWs in health care facilities providing direct patient care to persons
who had known or suspected filovirus disease (EVD or MVD) caused by any ebolavirus or
marburgvirus. Health care facilities refers to both treatment centers specifically set up for man-
aging filovirus disease (Ebola Treatment Centers), as well as to general health care treatment
facilities such as health centers and hospitals.
We defined a list of PPE components and comparisons as a guide to identify relevant stud-
ies, but remained open to other comparisons if encountered in the literature (Fig 1).
Outcomes were specified by the guideline development group and included transmission of
ebolavirus to HCWs and from HCWs to patients and adverse effects of using PPE such as per-
ceived inconvenience or discomfort, injuries (e.g. needlestick injury), dexterity, reduced visibil-
ity, and heat-related events. Other outcomes in reports were also extracted.
As per our protocol, we first sought high quality systematic reviews, evidence-based clinical
practice guidelines, and health technology assessments. In their absence, primary studies were
retrieved using an evidence hierarchy: randomized controlled trials; quasi-experimental
designs; comparative cohort, case-control studies, and cross-sectional studies, and in the event
of no comparative evidence, we searched for and included data from non-comparative studies.
We considered studies published in either English or French published in 1967 (when filovi-
rus disease first emerged) or later. No geographical restrictions were applied.
Because our initial search identified few publications, we expanded our search (as per our
protocol) to include studies reporting on Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever or Lassa fever as
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they were considered to have a similar mode of human-to-human transmission and infectivity
to the filovirus diseases.
Literature search
Electronic search strategies were developed and tested iteratively by an experienced medical
information specialist. Between 28 July and 7 August 2014, we searched Ovid MEDLINE and
Ovid MEDLINE In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations, The Cochrane Database of Sys-
tematic Reviews (limited to the Cochrane Infectious Diseases Review Group reviews and spe-
cialized register), EMBASE, and African Index Medicus. Search strategies were not limited by
language or year. A combination of controlled vocabulary and text-word terms were used (S3
Appendix), where possible. The initial MEDLINE search strategy was adapted to the other
databases. Study design filters were applied.
Grey literature sources were searched on 20–22 August 2014 using the ProQuest Disserta-
tion and Theses Databases and the Google Search Engine. We also searched ClinicalTrials.gov
andWHO International Clinical Trials Registry Platform search portal to seek ongoing and
completed trials. References of included studies were scanned. Acquisition of articles was
focused to those available electronically through the research team’s institutional subscription;
some full-text reports were sought elsewhere where time permitted.
Study selection and data extraction
De-duplicated citations in Reference Manager were uploaded to Distiller Systematic Review
software for screening. Single reviewers assessed titles and abstracts with excluded records veri-
fied by a second reviewer. Any records with disagreements underwent full-text screening. Full-
text reports were reviewed independently by two people, and disagreements between pairwise
Fig 1. Comparisons of personal protective equipment to prevent transmission of ebolavirus to health
care workers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140290.g001
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reviewers were resolved by consensus or a third reviewer. Screening forms were pilot-tested
using 15 (title/abstract) and 10 records (full text), respectively.
Single extractors collected information from studies, and a second person verified 57% of
information. The extraction form was pilot-tested on nine included studies. Authors of
included studies were not contacted for additional information due to time constraints.
Evidence Synthesis
Study characteristics are described narratively. Due to the nature and heterogeneity of included
studies, meta-analysis of results was not done. Plots summarizing the proportion of HCWs
reported to have experienced an outcome were produced where appropriate. The denominator
included HCWs at risk for whom we knew the PPE worn.
Risk of bias assessments were not done due to the lack of validated instruments to assess the
methodological quality of non-comparative designs [20].
Domains of the Grading of Recommendations Assessment Development and Evaluation
(GRADE) framework were used to inform judgments on the quality of the evidence across
studies for each outcome [21]. This framework initially considers evidence from observational
studies as low quality and randomized controlled trials as high quality. Five domains related to
quality are then assessed and used to determine the quality of the body of evidence for each
outcome across studies: study limitations, consistency, directness, precision, and publication
bias. Observational evidence without important threats to validity can be upgraded when there
is a dose-response effect, a large magnitude of effect, or because plausible biases may have
decreased the observed effect.
The study limitations domain addresses the risk of bias (internal validity) of studies [21].
Consistency addresses the degree to which studies yield similar results,while directness consid-
ers the degree to which the evidence aligns with the population, interventions, and outcomes of
interest[22,23]. Precision judges the extent of random error by taking the sample size, number
of observed events, and confidence intervals into consideration [24]. The publication bias
domain addresses the degree to which published and unpublished studies yield systematically
different findings [25].
Protocol modifications
We were able to increase the verification of extracted information from 10% to 57% of included
studies.
Results
Identification of relevant studies
A total of 1,215 unique records were retrieved. No systematic reviews, evidence-based clinical
practive guidelines or health technology assessment reports were identified. Furthermore, no
comparative primary studies or ongoing trials were identified. However, 30 non-comparative
studies [26–55] fulfilled the eligibility criteria (Fig 2). Ten of the 30 studies were identified
through a scan of reference lists of included studies. A list of studies excluded following full-
text review and reasons for exclusion are provided in S4 Appendix.
Characteristics of studies and study populations
The characteristics of studies reporting on gloves are provided in Fig 3. Studies reporting on
other PPE combinations are summarized in S1–S16 Tables. Studies were published between
1969 and 2013 and conducted in Africa [26,27,32,33,36,38,39,49–53,55], Europe (including
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PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0140290 October 9, 2015 5 / 17
Turkey) [30,31,34,35,37,42,43,47,48,54], South Asia andWestern Asia [28,29,46], North Amer-
ica [40,41,45], and one study included HCWs in Africa and HCWs in Europe because of a
patient repatriated to Europe [44].
Fig 2. PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) flow diagram of the study selection process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140290.g002
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Eleven studies [26,27,32,33,35,36,39,49,50,54,55] reported on filoviruses, two on unspecified
viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHF) [37,45], 11 on Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever [28–31,34,
42–44,46,48,53], and six on Lassa fever [38,40,41,47,51,52]. Of the eight studies reporting on
ebolavirus, three reported outbreaks of Sudan virus [32,33,55], four of Ebola virus [26,27,36,49],
and one of Taï Forest virus [35].
While three studies were case reports of HCWs [34,46,54], a majority of studies involved
contact tracing of HCWs providing care to index patients. Seven studies monitored HCWs for
at least three weeks for outcomes, while others used a shorter follow-up,did not report this
information, or did not actively follow participants.
Most studies examined nurses and physicians with or without other personnel providing
patient care, including medical students, assistants, and other auxiliary staff members. Data
from some studies included other personnel not providing direct patient care (e.g., laboratory
workers, housekeeping staff, and administrative staff). Sample sizes were not consistently
reported, and some studies reported the total number of contacts but did not specify the pro-
portion of HCWs.
Personal Protective Equipment
Only one study was designed with the intent to evaluate PPE use [30]. The PPE protocols var-
ied across and within studies, i.e., over the duration of the care period or among HCWs. Several
reports [27,36–39,41,49,50,55] described changes to the protocol, including delayed implemen-
tation of PPE or sequential introduction of PPE components during an outbreak. Three reports
[29,38,44] traced HCW contacts from multiple health care facilities and described varying PPE
protocols across the settings. A few studies reported varied adherence to the PPE protocol
among HCWs within a given study [30,31,43] or only described the PPE used by a subset of
HCW contacts (e.g., those who subsequently developed the disease) [27,28,34,46]. Three stud-
ies [33,42,50] reported adoption of established PPE guidelines for the management of patients
with VHFs including those developed by WHO and the Advisory Committee on Dangerous
Pathogens.
Fig 3. Non-comparative studies of healthcare workers wearing gloves, masks, gowns, and glasses/goggles. Abbreviations: ELISA = enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay; HCW = healthcare worker; IgG = immunoglobulin G; IgM = immunoglobulin M; NA = not applicable; NR = not reported;
PPE = personal protective equipment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140290.g003
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Although we did not perform a formal assessment of the completeness of reporting across
studies, our impression is that the reporting of PPE protocols was poor. In most reports, only a
general description was provided of the components of PPE used without indication of the
quality or specific characteristics (e.g., disposability, permeability, and other specifications).
Further, important details including the quantity of each component used simultaneously by a
single HCW (i.e., single or double gloves or gowns) was not reported. Some studies only par-
tially reported the PPE protocol. For example, several studies specified one element of PPE
(e.g., gloves, respirators, masks) but the remaining components were not described in detail
(e.g., ‘protective clothing’, ‘barrier techniques’) [26,29,41,47,54].
Outcomes
Nearly all studies (90%; 27/30) reported on virus transmission from infected patients to
HCWs. One study [45] reported no outcomes of interest as VHF was ruled out. Half of the
studies measured virus transmission based on symptoms, serology and/or polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) for at least a subset of HCWs [28–30,33,34,36,38–40,43,46,47,49–51,53,55].
The remaining studies used only symptoms [27,41,44,48,54], serologic or PCR/reverse tran-
scription-PCR testing [31,35,52], or the method of ascertainment was not reported
[26,32,37,42]. Three studies [30,31,52] reported on antibody prevalence among HCWs exposed
to Crimean-Congo and Lassa fever virus.
The proportion of HCWs who experienced an event are presented (Figs 3–6, S1–S16
Tables), grouped by the combination of PPE elements worn. For filovirus disease, five of 11
studies reported virus transmission to HCWs having worn a variety of PPE combinations (Fig
4). One of those studies was unclear regarding timing of transmission (i.e., at what point during
PPE protocol). Eight of 16 studies examining other types of VHFs reported viral transmission
to HCWs having worn a various PPE combinations.
No studies reported on dexterity with the use of gloves or on adverse effects such as discom-
fort, reduced visibility, high temperatures, or humidity. Eight studies reported on needle stick
injuries [29–31,34,37,43,53,54], one study on inadvertent touching of face with contaminated
gloves [27], and one on glove perforation [29]. The proportion of HCWs with other outcomes
(needle stick injury, glove perforation, and antibody prevalence) are shown in Figs 5 and 6.
Sources of Support
One study clearly indicated their sources of financial support [47]. Four studies indicated
sources of support but did not provide the nature of the support [30,32,39,43]. Four studies
listed the participation of organizations in providing or inferring outbreak support
[27,33,49,55]. No companies manufacturing PPE components were listed among the involved
organizations.
Discussion
In this rapid review, we identified 30 observational studies of PPE in the context of VHFs, of
which 11 addressed filovirus disease. However, none of these studies compared different
approaches to personal protection or different types of PPE. All studies included in this review,
therefore, provide insufficient evidence on the comparative effectiveness of the different PPE
protocols.
Only one study was designed with the intent to evaluate PPE use [30]. Most reports involved
contact tracing of HCWs providing care to index patients.
Using the GRADE framework, the quality of the body of evidence for all outcomes was
assessed as very low. Despite the lack of validated instruments for evaluating the internal
Protective Equipment Use in Filovirus Rapid Review
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Fig 4. Virus transmission in non-comparative studies of healthcare workers wearing personal protective equipment. Abbreviations: CI = confidence
interval; n = number of events; N = number of HCWs at risk for whom we knew the PPE worn; NR = not reported; WHO =World Health Organization. aMost
studies did not provide data on all healthcare workers; only workers with available data were included. bCase reports: One report on filovirus (Martini 1969)
and one on Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (Naderi 2011) were identified. cOne case report on Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (Tutuncu 2009) was
identified. dOne case report on Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (Naderi 2011) was identified. ePPE protocol was altered during process of care; unclear
whether events occurred before or after the enhanced PPE protocol was implemented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140290.g004
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validity of non-comparative studies, we can assume the literature to be at a high risk of bias.
Given the body of evidence is non-comparative, this poses very serious limitations in terms of
the directness of the evidence to the question of comparative effectiveness. The heterogeneity
of the PPE components across and within studies over the duration of care and the heterogene-
ity of study designs limit the ability to assess the consistency of the data; most PPE combina-
tions were reported by one study only. Estimates of the proportion of HCWs contracting the
infection was generally based on small numbers and therefore imprecise. Publication bias
could not be assessed quantitatively, and we do not know whether unpublished studies exist
with systematically different findings.
Fig 5. Needle stick injury in non-comparative studies of healthcare workers wearing personal protective equipment. Abbreviations: CI = confidence
interval; n = number of events; N = number of HCWs at risk for whom we knew the PPE worn. aMost studies did not provide data on all healthcare workers;
only workers with available data were included. bOne case report on filovirus (Martini 1969) was also identified. cOne case report on Crimean-Congo
hemorrhagic fever (Tutuncu 2009) was also identified.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140290.g005
Fig 6. Other adverse events in non-comparative studies of healthcare workers wearing personal protective equipment. Abbreviations:
CI = confidence interval; n = number of events; N = number of HCWs at risk for whom we knew the PPE worn; NR = not reported; WHO =World Health
Organization. aMost studies did not provide data on all healthcare workers; only workers with available data were included.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140290.g006
Protective Equipment Use in Filovirus Rapid Review
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Only some of the studies monitoring a cohort of HCWs over a period of time did so for at
least three weeks, the maximum incubation period described in the literature for filoviruses.
Some cases of transmission may, therefore, have been missed. WHO recommends reverse tran-
scriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) or enzyme linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) tests for the diagnosis of EVD, and we know at least some of the included studies
incorporated these methods in the diagnostic work-up. However, a positive PCR test indicates
the presence of viral particles which may or may not be infectious; therefore cell culture is
needed for definitive diagnosis for EVD and MVD. Some of the studies relied solely on self-
reported symptoms and temperature readings. Such studies are susceptible to bias as data on
PPE was self-reported and, in a number of cases, retrospectively ascertained. In addition, it was
unclear for many of the studies whether all HCWs in contact with patients were followed. It is
possible that the proportion of HCWs infected were overestimated because those contracting
EVD were probably more likely to be identified than those not contracting the disease.
When the PPE protocol was described, the reporting was poor and often lacked important
details on the characteristics of the equipment (e.g., quality, disposability, permeability) and
methods of donning and doffing. In some studies, outcomes could not be attributed to a partic-
ular PPE protocol because the PPE components were either not reported or poorly reported, or
the protocol was altered during the process of care. The PPE worn by all exposed HCWs was
not always adequately described. In some studies the recommended PPE was reported, while
adherence was not. Lastly, determining the proportion of HCWs infected was often precluded
by inadequate reporting of the sample size of exposed HCWs.
Two EVD studies postulated that transmission was due to protocol violations[33], including
possible inadvertent touching of the face [27]. Where transmission was observed, it was diffi-
cult to attribute causation because of limitations of the observational studies included in this
review, the possibility of other sources of transmission (for example, EVD cases in the commu-
nity), and poor reporting. This was true even where needle stick injuries or glove perforations
occurred as necessary details to definitively attribute causation (e.g., details and timing of PPE
use) were not provided. Phylogenetic analyses can contribute to estimating the source of infec-
tion but such analyses were not done in the studies of HCWs included in this review.
Finally, it is important to consider that PPE is only one factor within the larger context of
IPC. Other factors such as hand hygiene and environmental cleaning were beyond the scope of
this review, but are critical elements in the development and implementation of IPC.
Strengths and limitations of the rapid review
This rapid review was guided by protocol developed a priori. Although we limited the extent of
bibliographic database searching, we searched African Index Medicus and grey literature
sources to reduce the risk of location and publication biases. We used standard systematic
approaches for study selection, data extraction, and synthesis. We also assessed the quality of
the body of evidence using GRADE. Although intended as a rapid review, our work closely
approximated that of a systematic review.
Limitations of our work stem from time constraints: search strategies were not peer-
reviewed, we were unable to locate twelve full-text articles (S4 Appendix); and outcome extrac-
tions for 40% of studies were not verified by a second person.
Future research
Circumstances surrounding the ongoing EVD outbreak, including extremely challenging
working conditions, scarce resourses, population mobility, and deteriorated healthcare systems
and infrastructures, make it difficult to collect data for inclusion in this review and possibly for
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any future review update. However, efforts to collect data should be undertaken wherever pos-
sible. For example, comparative observational studies are needed to supplement the current
evidence. Although case-control studies may be the most feasible, comparative cohort studies
would be scientifically stronger. Further, randomized trials of the various components of PPE
may be difficult to implement. More specifically, studies evaluating the current PPE protocols
of organizations should be undertaken. For example, the WHO guidance released in on 31
October 2014 recommends the use of face shields or googles for eye protection; however,
empirical data comparing those forms of eye protection regarding transmissions and adverse
effects (e.g., fogging, visibility) are currently not available.
Future research would benefit from standardized data collection instruments and popula-
tion-based registries enabling synthesis of larger sample sizes. Also, an ongoing environmental
scan of in-progress studies from various healthcare organizations providing service to African
nations should be conducted. Although outside the scope of the rapid review, evidence is also
needed for workers not providing direct clinical care.
Phylogenetic tracing should be performed where possible to estimate source of infection.
Attention should also be given to collecting adverse outcomes of PPE use (e.g., inconvenience,
discomfort, heat-related events, impaired dexterity, etc.).
Future studies need to be carefully and completely reported, using reporting guidelines such
as CARE for clinical case reports, STROBE for observational studies, and CONSORT for ran-
domized controlled trials. The use of such guidelines will facilitate adequate reporting and thus
increase the usability of research reports, which will, in turn, facilitate decision making.
Another aspect of future research involves materials science and engineering. Technological
advances to improve generally understood safety issues with PPE use, such as dexterity, com-
fort, and heat, and also to minimize the risk of contamination during the donning and doffing
process while acting as a barrier to virus transmission during use would be ideal.
Implications for policy and practice
While we await better evidence to inform this topic, organizations and individuals need to con-
sider how best to move forward with recommendations regarding PPE use. Although some
may consider a zero-tolerance (100% effectiveness) approach, a number of reasons may pre-
clude this as a strategy. First, we located no evidence that suggests totally impermeable materi-
als are more effective than ‘only’ fluid-resistant materials for reducing virus transmission.
Second, as mentioned earlier, a number of reasons may account for virus transmission, such as
long working hours and transmission outside the patient care setting; WHO is in the process of
finalizing an epidemiologic analysis of a subset of HCWs to better understand transmission
cause. Although the adequacy of the PPE worn is important, correct donning and doffing of
the equipment is an integral process for preventing infection [56]. There is general agreement
as per knowledge and understanding among co-authors from this recent EVD outbreak that
lack of adequate training on IPC, including donning and doffing, was an important factor for
virus transmission. Further, a recent literature review identified inappropriate use of PPE and
inadequate training as risk factors for HCW infections [57]. As a result, provision of training to
HCWs in affected regions was identified as a “key strategy” for preventing ebolavirus transmis-
sion. In collaboration with other organizations responding to the ongoing EVD outbreak,
WHO has developed job aids for HCWs on how to put on and remove PPE, and provided
training on clinical management (including IPC measures) to over 4500 health responders on
the ground in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as of June 2015 [58,59]. Additional measures,
such as ongoing guidance and monitoring of HCWs through the donning and doffing proce-
dure, were also implemented in MSF Ebola treatment centers [56]. Readers can refer to WHO
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rapid advice guidance as an example of recommendations made by this organization following
the completion of this rapid review [17].
Conclusion
Insufficient comparative evidence exists to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness and
harms of robust personal protective equipment compared with alternative, and potentially less
robust personal protective equipment for healthcare workers providing direct patient care to
those with filovirus disease.
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